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La Réglementation Des Fonds Spéculatifs/ The Regulation Of Private Equity, Hedge 
Funds And State Funds 
Revised United States National Report 
for the 
XVIIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law 
Henry Ordower,1 Professor of Law 
Saint Louis University School of Law  
United States Reporter 
This United States report responds to a questionnaire that the general reporter for the 
project prepared.  At the time the United States reporter prepared the report for the 
Congress, the United States Congress had not acted upon legislative proposals concerning 
registration of investment advisers to private funds and derivatives.  On July 21, 2010, 
the President of the United States signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act2 into law.  This revised report includes reference to that Act 
and supersedes the report appearing on the website for the IACL Congress.  The general 
reporter’s questionnaire is in an appendix to the United States report.  For easy reference, 
short forms of some recurrent terms in the United States report appear in the following 
glossary. 
Glossary of Terms in this Report. 
“BHC” means Bank Holding Company Act.
“CEA” means the Commodities Exchange Act.
“CFIUS” means Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. 
“CFTC” means the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the regulatory agency 
for commodities, swaps, and derivatives, other than security-based swaps and derivatives. 
“Dodd-Frank” means the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. Law 111-203 (July 21, 2010). 
“Exchange Act” means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
“FINRA” means the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, an SRO formed from 
consolidating the member regulatory function of the New York Stock Exchange and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers in 2007. 
1 AB Washington University, MA, JD The University of Chicago.  Co-Director, Center for International 
and Comparative Law.  The reporter thanks Ilene Ordower for her edit of the manuscript and Kim 
Hemenway, a Saint Louis University law student, for research assistance and preparation of the initial draft 
of the section on sovereign wealth funds. 
2 P.L. 111-203 (July 21, 2010) was H.R. 4173.  The bill passed the Senate and was sent to the President on 
July 15, 2010.  The President signed the legislation on July 21, 2010. 
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“FRB” means the Federal Reserve Bank.
“IAA” means the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended.
“ICA” means the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.
“IMF” means International Monetary Fund. 
“IRC” means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, the United States federal 
tax laws. 
“IRS” means the Internal Revenue Service, part of the United States Department of the 
Treasury that has primary administrative responsibility for interpretation and enforcement 
of the IRC.  
“IWG” means International Working Group of SWFs.
“SEC” means the Securities Exchange Commission, a federal agency responsible for 
interpretation and enforcement of the securities laws of the United States, including the 
Exchange Act, the Securities Act, the ICA and the IAA. 
“Securities Act” means the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
“SRO” means a self-regulatory organization established under section 19 of the 
Exchange Act.  
“SWF” means Sovereign Wealth Fund. 
United States Reporter’s Overview.3 In current usage in the United States, the concept 
of “hedge fund” is now reasonably settled.  A hedge fund is a managed pool of capital 
that would be an “investment company,” as ICA §3(a) defines that term, but for the 
limited number and wealth characteristics of the owners of the interests in the pool.4  The 
ICA regulates most aspects of investment companies’ management and operation.  Since 
hedge funds resemble but are not investment companies under the ICA, they are not 
subject to regulation under that statute.  It is this absence of ICA regulation, and 
accompanying IAA regulation for the funds’ investment advisers,5 that defines the hedge 
fund rather than any set of regulations applicable to the fund.   
Following the recent worldwide downturn in the financial services industries, the retreat 
of the securities markets, and the massive investor losses from fraud in the form of 
3 For a general explanation of U.S. managed hedge funds and their operations and structures, see Henry 
Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS BUSINESS L. J. 323 (2007).  This 
national report relies in part on that article.   
4 See discussion infra in text accompanying and following note 41. 
5 This report uses the terms investment adviser and manager interchangeably.  The IAA uses the term 
investment adviser for advisers who must register under the IAA. 
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pyramid schemes, especially Bernard Madoff’s pyramid scheme,6 debate in legislatures 
and in the media has focused on new protections for investors and the integrity of the 
financial markets.  Systemic risk, including counterparty risk in derivative products, like 
AIG’s credit default swaps, and risk to investors from massive frauds have rallied 
legislators and commentators to re-examine the adequacy of existing regulation.  A 
similar outcry for regulatory change followed the failure of Long Term Capital 
Management in 1999,7 yet, as the markets recovered, no material regulatory change 
followed in the United States.  On this occasion, however, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank 
and the President signed it into law.  This new legislation addresses systemic risk by 
requiring clearing for many derivative products8 and registration for most investment 
advisors to hedge and private equity funds.9  It also includes a modicum of investor 
protection by requiring safeguarding and auditing of custodial funds.10  This report will 
address that debate and the new legislation in the context of additional regulation for 
pooled investments, like hedge and private equity funds, which now are only lightly 
regulated.   
In order to gain insight into the function of hedge funds and private equity funds within 
the world of investment capital and investment products, I will contrast hedge funds with 
investment companies and distinguish them from similarly unregulated, private equity 
funds in terms of liquidity and investment strategies.  The report will include a brief 
review of securities and investment company regulatory history in the United States to 
help place the discussion in perspective.   
As a discrete part of the report, I will review the operation and legal treatment of 
sovereign wealth funds operating or investing in the United States.  That discussion will 
concern itself with the possible mixing of political with investment objectives and the 
issue of whether or not to tax such funds. 
A.  Federal Securities and Investment Company Laws for Investor Protection not 
Systemic Risk.  Following the crash of the United States markets in 1929, the United 
States Congress sought to prevent future market failures that injured so many investors.  
Congress settled on a strategy that relied on information disclosure.  The strategy 
assumed that the market would assimilate the publicly disclosed information that the law 
would require and disseminate the analysis of the information to enable investors to make 
6 Ponzi scheme is the colloquial term for pyramid schemes like the one Bernard Madoff operated.  The 
operator of a pyramid scheme uses funds contributed by new investors to pay a favorable return on 
investment to existing investors.  So long as a constant inflow of new investment exceeds the withdrawals 
from the artificial investment pool, the scheme works.  With the 2008 economic downturn, there were more 
requests for withdrawal from the Madoff investment funds than newly invested capital causing the scheme
to collapse.  Lack of transparency in private investment funds generally lends itself to such fraudulent 
schemes, as no independent governmental agency or SRO is monitoring the actual existence of the fund’s 
investment positions.   
7 Discussed infra in text accompanying note 33. 
8 Titles VII and VIII of Dodd-Frank. 
9 Title IV of Dodd-Frank. 
10 Section 411 of Dodd-Frank adds section 223 to the IAA. 
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informed investment decisions.11  Some years later, Congress developed a more parental 
protection system for investors in investment funds.12
1.  Disclosure and Investor Protection.  The United States securities and investment 
company statutes focus on investor protection.  The statutes rely primarily on disclosure 
to enable investors to control their investment risk by providing them the information 
necessary to evaluate a proposed investment with the help of market professionals.  
Professional participants in the market assimilate the publicly disclosed information and 
make professional and informed recommendations to investors.  Sophisticated investors 
also may analyze the public information independently to determine whether or not they 
wish to make the proffered investment.13  In addition, SROs, including the national 
securities exchanges that are subject to regulation under the Exchange Act, have “know 
your customer” rules applicable to their broker/dealer participants.14 These “know your 
customer” rules should, but do not necessarily, prevent brokers and dealers from selling 
inappropriate securities to those customers.15 The “know your customer” rule requires 
each broker or dealer to evaluate the public information and determine whether the 
security is suitable for the broker’s or dealer’s customers before the broker or dealer 
makes a recommendation to the customer to buy the security.16
Unless an exception applicable to a security exists, the issuer of the security must register 
the security under section 5 of the Securities Act.  The registration statement is a 
disclosure document and becomes publicly available.  In addition, the Securities Act 
requires that the issuer provide each purchaser of the securities from the issuer or an 
underwriter a prospectus in advance of the sale of the securities to the investor.  The 
prospectus must include all material information concerning the issuer and the securities.  
Information is material if the purchaser might find the information important in 
evaluating an opportunity to purchase the securities.  In addition to financial information, 
the prospectus includes information concerning the issuer’s business plan, proposed use 
of the proceeds from sale of the securities, and information about the issuer’s market and 
its managers.  There is little expectation, however, that the investor actually reads the 
prospectus.17  Rather the registration statement and prospectus place material information 
into the public domain where professional market participants, including brokers and 
dealers in securities, may assimilate the information and make informed 
recommendations to their customers with respect to the proposed investment and its 
11 The Securities Act and the Exchange Act. 
12 The ICA and IAA. 
13 See additional discussion infra in text accompanying note 17. 
14 Exchange Act section 6. 
15Recent manifestations of ―know your customer‖ rules relate marginally to the historical securities law 
rules.  Financial institutions currently must ―know their customers‖ in the sense of whether those customers 
are laundering money or funding terrorist activities. 
16 While violation of the ―know your customer‖ rule probably does not provide an independent claim for 
relief against a broker, although authorities are split on this issue, it may provide evidence of violation of 
the more general antifraud rules of the Exchange Act.   
17 Despite the statute, the delivery of the prospectus tends to lag the actual purchase of the securities.  
Presumably the reversal of the order gives the purchaser a right of rescission.  In view of the function of 
disclosure into the public domain and the market professionals’ assimilation of the public information, the 
investor has the protection of the efficient capital market hypothesis despite delivery of the prospectus later. 
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suitability for those customers (subject to the constraints of the “know your customer” 
rule the previous paragraph discusses).  
Following the sale of securities to the public, the Exchange Act regulates the market for 
information concerning issuers and resale of securities.  Companies, the shares of which 
trade publicly, generally have an obligation to report their financial results annually or 
more frequently.  In addition, each publicly traded company has an ongoing obligation to 
disseminate material information concerning its operations and management that might 
influence the value of its publicly traded securities, so that no one possessing the 
information may use it to his or her advantage in trading in the issuer’s securities.  
Shareholders may not exploit an information advantage they may have because of their 
position in the company to buy or sell shares before the information becomes public.18
While the ICA relies on disclosure as well, it and the IAA intervene in substantive ways 
to control investor risk more directly than through disclosure.  For example, the ICA 
prohibits investment advisers and promoters from engaging in transactions with the 
investment companies they promote or advise19 and requires investment companies to 
place and maintain their assets with independent banks or investment banks.20  Similarly, 
the SEC has promulgated a rule under the IAA that prohibits registered investment 
advisers or managers from retaining custody of the fund’s assets.21  The ICA also 
imposes limitations on composition of the investment company’s board of directors,22
requires an affirmative shareholders’ vote for changes in investment policy,23 and 
prevents investment companies from selling short or employing substantial borrowing 
18 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 that the SEC promulgated under that statute prohibit 
any form of market manipulation that results from an informational advantage.  Rule 10b-5 reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
17 CFR 240.10b-5.  See also Rule 10b5-1 applicable specifically to insider trading. 
19 ICA §17(a). 
20 ICA §17(f). 
21 Rule 206(4)-2 under IAA, 17 CFR 275.206(4)-2.  Some commentators believe that the applicability of 
that custodial rule to Bernard Madoff’s investment management activities would have prevented him from 
operating a Ponzi scheme, but Madoff may not have been acting as an investment manager at all.  Rather 
Madoff’s investors may have invested in his brokerage firm rather than any pooled fund.  Custodial rules 
apply to investments in investment companies and not to investments in ownership of a brokerage firm.  
IAA section 233, as added by section 411 of Dodd-Frank, requires investment advisers to safeguard and 
audit funds under custody but does not separate the custodial from the advising functions as required for 
investment companies. 
22 ICA §10(a) limits the interested board members to sixty percent of the board. 
23 ICA §13. 
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leverage,24 essentially limiting investment companies to substantially conservative paid, 
long positions.  The IAA imposes an array of requirements on registered investment 
advisers.  Among the requirements, are some that seek to prevent unscrupulous 
individuals from becoming registered advisers. 25  In addition, except in the case of 
qualified clients, the IAA restricts investment advisers from receiving performance fees 
that might cause their interests to conflict with those of their clients.26
While disclosure and the various investor protection measures under the ICA create a 
comprehensive, if somewhat narrow, system for investor protection, neither securities nor 
investment company regulation in the United States addressed systemic risk 
comprehensively even though systemic risk, for the moment, has become a grave, 
worldwide concern.  To the extent that securities laws protect the integrity of the markets, 
that protection primarily is for the benefit of the investors in the issue of securities and 
not to prevent collateral injury to the enterprise itself, its employees, the community, or 
other enterprises.  Collateral risks to non-investors have not been a matter for the SEC, as 
only investors who buy or sell securities have a claim under those statutes.  Some 
statutory authority allows the SEC to intervene on a limited basis where systemic risk is 
present.  For example, the SEC addresses systemic risk through its powers (i) to suspend 
trading in specific securities, (ii) to regulate industry participants, including brokers and 
dealers, and (iii) to impose various trading rules, such as the rule that outlawed the short 
selling of securities that were declining in value.27  Dodd-Frank focuses on systemic risk 
by requiring clearing of many derivative positions and recordkeeping for investment 
advisers to private funds. 
As early as the 1980s, the state Supreme Court of Delaware began to address protection 
of constituencies other than shareholders in its corporate takeover decisions.28  Those 
decisions suggest that the corporate managers may resist a takeover attempt to protect the 
corporate existence, its culture, and its constituencies other than shareholders.29
2.  Systemic Risk.  Preoccupation with systemic risk is a relatively new phenomenon, 
although the Commodities Exchange Act has spoken more directly to systemic risk by 
seeking to control counterparty default risk.  The trading of commodities futures 
contracts30 under the Commodities Exchange Act is in standardized units and uses a fully 
24 ICA §§12 and 18. 
25 IAA §203. 
26 IAA §205.  This report discusses Rule 205-3 and qualified clients and result fees infra in text 
accompanying note 80. 
27 Until July 2007, an SEC regulation allowed the sale of stock short only when the last trade had been an 
up tick in the stock price (or no change following an up tick).  Exchange Act Rule 10a-1 (repealed July 5, 
2007).  Recently, the SEC proposed that it adopt a short selling restriction again in order to limit short 
selling in declining markets out of concern that short selling contributed to artificial acceleration of 
declines in market values recently.  See Release No. 34-5974874, FR 18042 (April 20, 2009). 
28 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A. 2d 701 (Del 1983).  Delaware is the state of incorporation of the 
greatest number of publicly traded US corporations because its corporate laws favor management.   
29 Id.
30 Futures contracts create a mutual obligation to deliver and accept delivery of and pay for a quantity of a 
commodity at a designated future time and at a contractually designated price.  Despite that delivery 
requirement, futures contracts settle almost invariably in cash.  As the value of the contract fluctuates with 
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hedged clearinghouse.  The clearinghouse minimizes counterparty risk for investors by 
acting as the counterparty for all positions.  The clearinghouse limits its own counterparty 
exposure by marking to market all positions at least daily and accompanying those marks 
with margin adjustments – both calls and releases of margin.  Dodd-Frank has introduced 
a similar clearinghouse system for swaps and other derivative positions.  Most swaps and 
other derivative products, whether subject to CFTC regulation or SEC regulation become 
subject to clearing and maintenance of margin in order to control systemic risk.31  In 
addition, new conflict of interest rules will control investor risk and limit parties offering 
derivative and swap contracts from investing in a manner that conflicts with their 
customers.32  Similarly, as in the commodities markets, automatic suspensions of trading 
in the markets fend off possible panic reactions that might cause the market to collapse.   
Historically, there was little, if any, discussion of the currently prevalent concern that 
some businesses might be too large or important to be permitted to fail because of their 
potential impact on the entire market.  The collapse of Long Term Capital Management’s 
hedge fund group in 1998-9 may have been the harbinger of that preoccupation.33  Long 
Term Capital Management was arbitraging very large positions in sovereign debt and 
utilizing vast amounts of leverage, so that a very small price movement would yield a 
greatly magnified gain or loss.  When Russia suspended payments on its sovereign debt 
in mid-1998, investors sought to shift their debt positions to sovereign debt of G-7 
issuers.  Those shifts drove up the price of G-7 debt contrary to Long Term Capital 
Management’s investments.  While the United States government did not intervene with 
financial assistance to protect Long Term Capital Management or its investors, it did 
facilitate intervention by the membership of the New York Stock Exchange. 
B.  Hedge Fund Background:  Exemptions from Registration and Regulation, 
Structure, Taxation.  This section describes common hedge fund structures and 
exemptions from registration requirements and accompanying regulation. 
1.  Hedge Funds and Registration Exemptions.  Without regard to the particular 
structure of the hedge fund, interests in the fund are securities for purposes of both the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.  Since a manager, who may or may not own an 
interest in the fund, controls the fund’s assets and investments, any investors’ profit 
and derives from the spot price for the underlying commodity, futures contracts are derivative contracts.  
Futures contracts govern physical commodities like grain and various commodities like indices that have 
no physical manifestation.   
31 Dodd-Frank section725, for example, establishes the registration of derivatives clearing organizations, 
and section723 requires the clearing of swaps through one of the derivatives clearing organizations.   
32 Dodd-Frank section 732 and 765 requiting the CFTC and SEC to limit cross-ownership of clearing 
agencies to prevent conflicts of interest between parties that invest in derivatives and the clearing of 
derivatives. 
33 See, generally, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management – Report of 
the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, by representatives from the Commission, the 
Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Apr. 1999) 
(examining market crisis that failure of LTCM precipitated).  Note that in 1979-80, the federal government 
guaranteed loans for Chrysler Motor Company to protect the United States automobile industry and its 
collateral suppliers. 
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results from the efforts of others.34  The expectation that the investor will derive profit 
from the efforts of others is the principal identifying characteristic of a security.   
While registration of securities is cumbersome and expensive, those concerns may not be 
the hedge fund promoter’s chief reasons for avoiding registration.  Hedge fund promoters 
eschew registration of interests in the funds to prevent the public dissemination of 
information concerning the fund -- its positions, strategies, and advisers -- since the 
registration statement is a public document.  In some cases, registration jeopardizes 
incentive fees for hedge fund managers35 and fee generating custodial arrangements for 
the fund assets.36  Registration of the fund means registration as an investment company.   
The Securities Act exempts from registration distributions of securities that do not 
involve a public offering.37  Industry participants refer to this no public offering concept 
as the private placement exemption.  Underlying the private placement is the 
understanding that the investor does not require the protection that public disclosure of 
material information and market assimilation of that information provides.  The statute 
does not define a private placement, but the courts and the SEC have grafted various rules 
and tests to distinguish public from private offerings of securities.38
Private placement implies that there will be no general advertising or sales solicitation of 
the offering.  Identification of prospective purchasers depends upon the existence of some 
historical relationship between the issuer or one or more of its representatives and the 
prospective purchaser.  The relationship enables the issuer to ascertain that the investor is 
a suitable prospect for the investment.  In SEC v. Ralston Purina,39 the United States 
Supreme Court held that investors qualifying as purchasers of private placements must 
have (i) the wherewithal to bear the economic loss on failure of the investment, (ii) the 
sophistication, either themselves or with the assistance of their own advisers, to 
understand the investment and its risks, and (iii) access to the information that a 
registration statement would provide.   
Despite the private placement exemption, the Exchange Act’s general anti-fraud rules 
apply to interests in hedge funds.40  During the initial and continuing offering the issuer 
generally must provide private placement investors access to material information 
concerning the investment.  Prospective investors should have an opportunity to ask 
questions of the issuer and its representatives and to receive satisfactory and complete 
answers to enable the potential investors to evaluate the investment and its risks.  Most 
34 Securities Act §2(a)(1) defines ―security‖ broadly.  In addressing the question of interests in orange 
groves as investment contracts subject to the securities laws, the US Supreme Court approved these indicia 
of control and profit from the efforts of others.  SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
35 IAA §205(a).  See discussion infra of exceptions for ―qualified clients‖ that enable registered investment 
advisers to receive incentive fees under limited circumstances in text accompanying note 75.  Rule 205-3 
under the IAA. 
36 ICA §17(f) and Rule 206(4)-2 under the IAA. 
37 Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.   
38 For the SEC’s safe harbor rule, see Regulation D, Rules 501-508, under the Securities Act. 
39 346 U.S. 119 (U.S. 1953) 
40 See section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 under that statute.   
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hedge funds provide their investors a disclosure document in the form of a private 
placement memorandum, which standardizes the disclosure and assures the issuer that it 
has made necessary disclosures.41
If hedge funds engage primarily in investing in or trading securities, they fall within the 
definition of investment company under section 3(a)(1)(A) of the ICA, so that, absent an 
exemption, hedge funds must register as investment companies.42  Until 1997, hedge 
funds relied on the 100 beneficial owner exemption under section 3(c)(1) of the ICA to 
avoid classification as investment companies.  If the hedge fund did not have a public 
offering of its securities and limited the number of its owners to 100 persons, it was 
exempt from the investment company definition and the registration requirement.43  Since 
the United States securities laws protect only United States investors, both citizens and 
permanent residents, or activities that take place in the United States, non-resident alien 
investors and foreign entities did not count toward the 100 owner limitation.  
Nevertheless, the 100 United States investor limitation proved to be problematic for 
raising capital, as a very large average investment was essential to provide the manager 
with a sufficient pool of capital to invest (or so the industry argued successfully to the 
United States Congress).   
In 1997, the hedge fund industry captured additional investment slots when Congress 
added an exemption from the investment company definition for funds that only admitted 
very wealthy investors as owners.44 Funds that have as investors only “qualified 
purchasers” may have an unlimited number of owners.45  Qualified purchasers are 
investors who, in the case of individual investors, have at least $5 million, net of debt, in 
investments exclusive of the hedge fund in question.46
The $5 million minimum leaves the investor with significant capital even if the hedge 
fund investment becomes worthless.  Rarely does a hedge fund, despite employing 
significant leverage in its investments, adopt an investment structure that allows the 
manager to make mandatory capital calls on the investors.47  Only the investment that the 
investor makes or pledges to the fund is at risk for the investor, while the promoter, as 
41Attorneys tend to prepare the private placement memoranda with the assistance of their fund promoter 
clients.  Stylistically, the memoranda disclose material information in prose that often is difficult to read 
and understand.   
42 Some hedge funds may invest only in derivative products that are not securities or commodities and free 
from regulation in the US.  While I am unaware of any fund that has relied on investment solely in 
derivative products to avoid classification as an investment company, avoidance of the classification in this 
manner was theoretically possible until enactment of Dodd-Frank which classifies derivatives as either 
commodities or securities for regulatory purposes.   
43 The practical limitation was 99 as most hedge funds were limited partnerships with the promoter as the 
general partner occupying one of the beneficial ownership slots. 
44 ICA §3(c)(7).   
45 Exchange Act §12(g) requires issuers to register and file periodic reports if they have 500 or more 
shareholders.  In order to avoid registration under the Exchange Act, qualified purchaser funds under ICA 
§3(c)(7) must limit their investor number to 498 leaving one slot for the general partner of the hedge fund 
partnership. 
46 ICA §2(a)(51). 
47 On the other hand, private equity funds may have capital calls.   
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general partner, the lenders, and the fund’s derivative position counterparties bear the 
underlying risk from leverage.  If lenders and derivative position counterparties are too 
open-handed in their extensions of credit to hedge funds, failure of the hedge funds, as 
was the case with Long Term Capital Management and, more recently, AIG on its credit 
default swaps, put the lenders and derivative counterparties in financial jeopardy. 
By contrast, Lloyds of London utilized an unlimited investment risk model for its 
investors.  Investors in Lloyd’s insurance pools – referred to as “names” -- received a 
relatively high return on their invested capital.  If, however, the funds in the insurance 
pool proved inadequate to pay claims against the pool, Lloyds could call upon its pool 
names to pay the claims without limitation.  While historically Lloyds’ business model 
was extremely successful and the mystique of becoming a Lloyds’ name was evidence of 
one’s status, many Lloyds’ names risked losing their fortunes when some insurance risks 
proved less benign than people had thought.48  Environment hazards that Lloyds insured, 
such as asbestos, placed names at great economic risk and spurred substantial litigation 
against Lloyds under antifraud provisions of the United States and state securities laws.49
Management and Taxation Considerations.  Until 1997, United States -based hedge 
fund promoters generally located their funds and the management activities of those 
funds offshore.  Preferred jurisdictions included the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin 
Islands, and Bermuda.50  An offshore base was critical to prevent the funds’ trading 
income from becoming United States source income.51  Since the fund entities were 
foreign corporations for United States tax purposes and engaged in much of their trading 
activity for their own account in United States markets, the income remained non-United 
States source income only as long as the funds’ principal office was not in the United 
States.  Holding meetings and conducting other activities in the offshore jurisdiction were 
critical to determination of the location of the funds’ principal office.52  The island 
jurisdictions offered minimal, if any, taxation, little regulatory oversight (Bermuda 
possibly being the exception), English as a primary language, and easy access by air from 
New York City for the managers and directors to hold meetings and oversee the 
necessary offshore functions.   
48 For a theatrical description of the Lloyds’ business model, see David Hare, Amy’s View, Act 3 where 
Esme describes her visit to Lloyds in terms of the wood paneled conference room and the real china tea 
service.  She says nothing about disclosures or her understanding of any risks in the investment that 
ultimately causes the loss of most of her capital. 
49 See, for example, the litigation website at http://www.uniset.ca/lloyds_cases/lloyds_cases.html. 
50 Under the OECD harmful tax competition standard, the principal jurisdictions are tax havens.  HARMFUL 
TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (OECD, 1998). 
51 IRC §864(b)(2) provides a special rule that sources income for foreign individuals and corporations from 
trading securities and commodities for their own account outside the U.S. However, until an amendment in 
1997, that statute would have treated the trading income as U.S. source if the corporation’s principal office 
were in the U.S.  
52 Treas. reg. §1.864-2(c)(iii) set forth ten functions of a principal office and classified the office as U.S. or 
non-U.S. based upon where most of those functions took place.  Industry participants colloquially referred 
to those functions as the ―ten commandments.‖
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Whether those promoters chose their fund locations originally to facilitate tax avoidance 
for their United States investors is doubtful.53  While a small number of United States 
investors may have sought to hide their hedge fund income from United States taxation,54
the passive foreign investment company (PFIC) rules made that decision a risky choice.55
Many investors subject to United States taxation preferred to make the election available 
under the PFIC rules to include their shares of the income of the foreign corporation 
annually, rather than subjecting their eventual gain to the unfavorable PFIC tax regime.56
Obviously, those seeking to hide income could not make the election.   
After the Department of the Treasury adopted the so-called “check-the-box” rule for 
entity classification in 1997,57 many managers chose to have the foreign investment funds 
with United States taxable investors elect partnership status for tax purposes.  Under 
United States tax law, partnerships are transparent for tax purposes; the entity pays no 
tax, but its owners include their shares of the partnership’s tax items – income, loss, 
deduction, and credit – in their separate tax computations as if the partner received that 
share from the same source and in the same manner as the partnership did.58  Each 
investor receives a statement annually from the fund that shows the investor’s share of 
the fund’s tax items59 and reports that share on the investor’s United States federal 
income tax return.   
53 Recent disclosures show that numerous high net worth U.S. individuals secreted substantial funds in 
Swiss bank accounts.  David Voreacos and Carlyn Kolker, UBS Clients Await Details of U.S. -Swiss Pact 
on Secret Accounts, (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601102&sid=a9aCm.G382EA).  As 
their funds were already secretly offshore, those individuals would not need the assistance of hedge funds 
to evade U.S. taxes.  See, generally, Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 SAINT LOUIS U. L.
J.    (2010 forthcoming). 
54 U.S. citizens and permanent residents are subject to U.S. income tax on their worldwide income from all 
sources.  IRC §61.  To the extent that the income becomes subject to tax in another jurisdiction, the U.S. 
generally grants a credit or a deduction for the foreign tax the taxpayer pays.  IRC §901 provides for the 
foreign tax credit. 
55 IRC §1291 et seq. defines investment, as opposed to operating, foreign corporations as PFICs and 
imposes a tax on distributions and gain from the sale of interests in the foreign corporation attributable to 
years other than the year of distribution or sale under the PFIC rules at the maximum rate under U.S. law 
and an interest charge on the deferral over the period during which the investor held an interest in the 
foreign corporation.  Accordingly, some of the income of the foreign corporation that might have been long 
term capital gain if the U.S. investors had earned it directly would become ordinary income to the investors 
under the PFIC regime.  Long term capital gain currently is subject to a maximum rate of tax to U.S. 
individuals of 15 percent while ordinary income is subject to a maximum rate of 35 percent. 
56 IRC §1295 provides investors in PFICs with a qualified electing fund election that permits them to 
preserve the character of the fund’s income, long term capital gain or ordinary income, with the current 
inclusion of the income under IRC §1293.  Investors may defer inclusion by agreeing to pay interest on the 
deferred tax amount. 
57 Treas. reg. §301.7701-3 permits many foreign entities to elect classification as partnerships for U.S. tax 
purposes.  Because of some opportunities to game the U.S. foreign tax credit rules, the ―check-the-box‖ 
election currently is under siege.  President Obama’s tax reform proposals include repeal of the election.  
U.S. Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue 
Proposals 28 (May 11, 2009)(the ―green book‖).  See Lee Sheppard, Check-the-Box Repeal Likely to be 
Enacted, 124 TAX NOTES 116 (July 13, 2009). 
58 IRC §701 et seq.
59 For U.S. partnerships, the statement is a K-1 statement.  Since the foreign entity is not subject to U.S. 
taxing jurisdiction, it need not file a U.S. tax return, but it makes the necessary computations and reports to 
the investors on substitute K-1 forms. 
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However, the 1997 change in the principal office rule for sourcing income from securities 
trading obviated the need for United States managers to maintain extensive facilities and 
operations outside the United States. 60  With the statutory change, a United States 
principal office would no longer cause securities trading income to have a United States 
source if foreign investors or foreign funds received the income.  Operational shift to the 
United States without jeopardizing the foreign source for the income that foreign 
investors received led to an increasing use of United States limited partnerships for hedge 
funds.  The change facilitated the migration of many offshore funds with United States 
taxable investors to the United States and enabled hedge fund promoters to adopt the now 
common master-feeder structures for the hedge fund family.  United States investors 
would become limited partners in tax transparent, United States hedge fund limited 
partnerships.  The partnerships would admit only United States qualified purchaser 
investors,61 one or more offshore corporate funds, and possibly a United States 
partnership fund limited to 100 investors for non-qualified purchasers.62  Since the United 
States taxable investors would invest in the United States limited partnership, the 
offshore funds no longer needed to elect United States partnership status.  Those funds 
that invested in the partnership would not be engaged in a trade or business in the United 
States because of the source exemption for trading for one’s own account.63  The offshore 
fund could admit non-United States investors without limitation free from constraints of 
the securities and investment company laws of the United States. 
Since the offshore fund was not tax transparent for United States tax purposes, it (or a 
separate non-tax transparent offshore fund) would accommodate tax exempt United 
States investors, including retirement plans.64  If tax exempt United States investors 
joined the United States partnership directly, they would be likely to become subject to 
the unrelated business income tax.65  Since most hedge funds use borrowing leverage, 
hedge fund income in part is debt financed income.  A tax exempt investor’s share of that 
income would be debt financed and, therefore, subject to the unrelated business income 
tax.66  Absent tax transparency, however, the tax exempt investor derived gain from 
appreciation in the value of its interest in the offshore fund and not from the fund’s 
income.  That appreciation was not debt financed even though the underlying income, if 
received as a share of a partnership’s income, would be unrelated business income to the 
tax exempt investor.67
60 IRC §864(b).  Among the arguments for the change in the sourcing rule was that maintenance of an 
offshore office resulted in loss of revenue to the U.S. without creating any kind of useful barrier to the 
creation and management of the funds. 
61 ICA §2(a)(51) investors with at least $5 million of investments.  ICA 3(c)(7) funds.  
62 ICA §3(c)(1). 
63 IRC §864(b)(2).  This is a critical link in the U.S. tax rules because the general partnership rule is that a 
partner’s share of the partnership’s income retains the character in the partner’s hands that it would have in 
the partnership’s hands.  Thus partners in U.S. partnerships, whether general partners or limited partners, 
are engaged in the trade or business of the partnership.  
64 A U.S. corporation would work as well for tax exempt investors, but a U.S. corporate fund itself would 
be subject to U.S. income tax. 
65 IRC §511. 
66 IRC §514. 
67 IRC §702(b). 
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The needs of United States tax exempt investors and foreign investors wishing to remain 
free from United States regulatory oversight and taxation and possibly taxation in their 
home jurisdictions required the continued use of offshore funds.  Offshore funds also 
enabled United States managers to capture a tax deferral benefit on their own 
compensation by using rabbi trusts with the offshore hedge funds.68  To the extent that 
the hedge fund transferred the manager’s fees to a trust that remained subject to the 
claims of the fund’s creditors,69 the compensation was not taxable to the manager until 
withdrawn from the trust.70 The fund would transfer the manager’s incentive fees that 
were 10-20 percent of the increase in the value of the fund’s assets rather than the asset 
based fees that were one to two percent of the assets in the fund.  The fund could claim 
no deduction for the compensation until the manager included it in income, but the 
foreign and tax exempt investors were indifferent to the deduction, as they were not 
taxable in the United States.  At the same time, the deduction was not valuable to the 
fund itself, as its income was taxable in a low or no tax jurisdiction.  In 2006, Congress 
sought to curtail this practice by requiring current inclusion of such deferred 
compensation in the manager’s income.71  The deferral of compensation income was not 
without risk if the fund’s liabilities gave the fund’s creditors a claim to the trust’s assets.  
Careful drafting of the terms of the trust could minimize, but not eliminate, the risk.   
Hedge fund promoters preferred United States limited partnerships to limited liability 
companies, even though limited liability companies are partnerships for United States tax 
purposes.72  The limited partnership offered the manager unfettered management control 
without interference from the limited partners.  Even manager-managed limited liability 
companies may have members who are active in the conduct of a business and are 
somewhat more vulnerable to intervention from investors than are limited partnerships.73
With a limited partnership, it was simple for the manager to take its incentive fee as a 
partnership profit interest that might yield long term capital gain rather than ordinary 
compensation income.74
68 Henry Ordower, A Theorem for Compensation Deferral:  Doubling Your Blessings By Taking Your 
Rabbi Abroad, 47 THE TAX LAWYER 301 (1994) (suggesting the use of offshore rabbi trusts and analyzing 
their economics with present value analysis).  Compare this deferral structure with the opportunity to 
receive compensation as long term capital gain discussed in the text accompanying note 74 infra. 
69 A so-called ―rabbi‖ trust as it was a Jewish congregation that first established such a trust for deferred 
compensation for its rabbi. 
70 Under IRC 83, there was no taxable transfer while the trust’s assets remained subject to the claims of the 
hedge fund’s creditors.
71 IRC §409A(b).  
72 Under treas. reg. §301.7701-2(c)(1), the default classification for limited liability companies with more 
than one member is partnership for tax purposes. 
73 In fact, while a limited partner’s interest in an operating, as opposed to an investment, partnership 
generates passive activity income and loss for purposes of the passive activity loss limitations under IRC 
§469(h)(2), a member’s interest in a limited liability company does not necessary generate passive activity 
income and loss when the member materially participates in conducting a business as the cases of Garnett 
v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 19 (June 30, 2009) and Thompson v. United States, No. 06-211 T (Fed Cl. 
July 20, 2009), recently held. 
74 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 (treating the receipt of a profits interest for services as non-taxable 
when received, unless certain exceptions rendering valuation simple and straightforward apply, leaving the 
partner to receive a distributive share of the partnership’s income).  IRC §702(b). There is extensive current 
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C.  Registered Hedge Funds.  Investment advisers to investment companies must 
register under the IAA75 and, generally, may not receive any portion of the investment 
company’s gains or capital appreciation as a fee.76  This incentive fee prohibition does 
not apply to investment advisers who or which are exempt from registration under the 
IAA.77  As hedge fund advisers normally receive a result fee of ten to twenty percent of 
the fund’s capital appreciation, either as a fee or as a profit participation,78 registration 
would be costly to successful managers if it resulted in losing their incentive fees.  SEC 
rules promulgated first in 1985, and later amended, permit registered advisers to 
unregistered qualified purchaser investment funds79 and to “qualified clients” to receive 
an incentive fee.80  Investment advisers may contract to charge incentive fees to investors 
in registered investment companies with qualified clients, as long as any unqualified 
client investor does not pay an incentive fee.  These “qualified client” investment 
companies largely take the form of hedge funds that invested in other hedge funds, so-
discussion of whether or not to alter U.S. tax rules to treat those profits interests that participants in the 
industry refer to as ―carried interests‖ as ordinary income rather than as a share of the partnership’s profit 
having the same character as the income has to the partnership – possibly long term capital gain.  Current 
tax reform proposals would classify the income from carried interests as ordinary income.  The green book, 
supra note 57 at 23.  The most recent proposing pending, but currently stalled, in the U.S. Congress is the 
American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213 (last action June 22, 2010), would add 
section 710 to the IRC and tax all or part of income from the carried interest as ordinary rather than capital 
for investment service partnerships.  See, generally on the issue of service partnerships, Henry Ordower, 
Taxing Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 The Tax Lawyer 19 (1992) (arguing that the 
profits interests should be taxable as open transactions) and Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing 
Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (2008) (analyzing various arguments for 
taxing a profits interest but concluding that the private equity fund managers should have ordinary income 
from their profits interests in the private equity funds).  The long term capital gain/compensation issue 
affects private equity fund managers somewhat more than hedge fund managers because much hedge fund 
income is ordinary income or short term capital gain, taxed under U.S. law as ordinary income to the extent 
that it does not offset long or short term capital loss.  Some hedge funds trade commodities yielding gain 
and loss that is 60 percent long term and 40 percent short term capital under IRC §1256.  Private equity 
funds often sell large positions in a single corporation that the fund has held for more than a year thereby 
yielding substantial long term capital gain. 
75 IAA §203(b)(3). 
76 IAA §205(a).   
77 Hedge fund advisers generally rely on the registration exemption under IAA §203(b)(3) for advisers 
having fewer than fifteen clients.  In 2006, the SEC sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to extend mandatory 
registration under the IAA to many hedge fund managers.  IAA Rule 203(b)(3)-2 (invalidated and 
withdrawn).  In Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
invalidated the new regulations following the date on which managers first had to register under the 
regulations.  The revised regulations would have altered the manner in which an investment advisor counts 
clients.  Managers who previously did not have to register because they had fewer than fifteen clients 
would have had to count each investor in a hedge fund — rather than only the fund itself — as a client for 
purposes of the fewer than fifteen client rule.  Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds, supra, note 3 at 4. 
78 See discussion of the profit participation supra in note 74 and accompanying text. 
79 Funds exempt under ICA §3(c)(7).  
80 IAA Rule 205-3.  Registered investment advisers may charge incentive or result fees to ―qualified 
clients‖ who, in the case of individuals, have at least $1.5 million in assets under the current rule, as 
opposed to the $1 million asset threshold for ―accredited investors‖ to whom issuers may sell private 
placement securities with no limit on the number of offerees or investors.  See Securities Act Reg. D and 
Rule 501.  
Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and Sovereign Wealth Funds 
United States of America Report  
Professor Henry Ordower, Reporter 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
18th Congress, International Academy of Comparative Law 2010 Page 16 
called “funds of funds.”  By investing in other hedge funds, the registered company does 
not run afoul of limitations under the ICA on use of financial leverage or short selling, as 
those activities would occur only at the level of the funds in which the registered fund 
invested and not in the registered fund itself.   
This retail product of a registered fund of funds emerged when the SEC permitted the 
incentive fees in 1985 but did not capture any significant portion of the investment 
company market until later.  While I am certain that the number of registered funds of 
hedge funds grew steadily after 1998, published statistics do not track those funds 
separately.81  A recent government study estimates that there are 1991 registered hedge 
fund advisers.82  That number of registered advisers will grow materially under Dodd-
Frank which eliminates the exemption from registration for most advisers to hedge 
funds.83 Registration will not affect the advisers’ ability to collect incentive fees.
D.  Private Equity Funds Contrasted with Hedge Funds.  Hedge funds and private 
equity funds often resemble one another structurally.  As hedge fund managers employ a 
broad range of investment strategies, it is difficult to generalize a description of hedge 
fund investing.  Hedge funds tend to trade actively, taking both long and short positions.  
Hedge funds invest in a diverse portfolio of securities, derivative positions, and, 
sometimes, commodities, and seek to maintain relative liquidity so that their investors 
may invest and disinvest at regular intervals ranging from monthly to annually.  
Illiquidity hinders disinvestment at times, and hedge funds need to create a “side-pocket” 
for illiquid positions, so that investors wishing to disinvest may redeem the bulk of their 
investment but continue to own an interest in the side-pocket until the fund ultimately 
disposes of the illiquid positions.  Hedge funds only occasionally acquire a sufficiently 
large position to control a company although they may acquire a large position with the 
intention of influencing management in order to affect the short term share price and 
value of the investment.  Influence is not generally the primary objective and hedge funds 
may risk violating the antifraud rules of the Exchange Act if their influence constitutes 
share price manipulation. 
Private equity funds focus their portfolios on one or a few positions for a long term 
investment strategy often with the objective to acquire control of their investment targets 
in order to capture management.  The funds seek to increase the value of the target, 
possibly only short term, so that the target will have sufficient resources to pay the 
private equity fund’s acquisition indebtedness and provide a substantial return to the 
private equity fund investor over a two to five year period.   
Once in control, private equity funds tend to alter the structure of their targets by 
disposing of assets that the targets do not deploy efficiently and replacing or restructuring 
management and the target’s business plan to enhance value – at least in the short term.  
81 See, for example, Investment Company Institute, 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, available at 
http://www.icifactbook.org/index.html. 
82 GAO 09-677T, Hedge Funds:  Overview of Regulatory Oversight, Counterparty Risks, and Investment 
Challenges (Statement of Orice M. Williams, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment) 7 
(May 7, 2009).  
83 Section 403 of Dodd-Frank. 
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At the end of the two to five year period investment window, the private equity fund 
either will resell the target or syndicate it in a public offering of shares.  The fund then 
returns its capital to its investors, or, alternatively, invests in another target enterprise 
allowing investors who prefer to withdraw their investment in the fund.  Accordingly, 
private equity fund investments are illiquid, with investors committing their capital for 
the full investment window.84  Occasionally, the private equity funds will make provision 
for capital calls on the investors, or, alternatively, provide the investors the opportunity to 
invest further capital as needed in preference to new investors.  If the fund has capital 
calls, there is a ceiling amount that the investor must contribute to the fund.  An open-
ended commitment like the Lloyds of London model for its names would be exceptional. 
The fund adviser uses the same fee structure as a hedge fund adviser – as a general 
guideline, two percent annually of the fund’s assets and twenty percent of the increase in
the fund’s value.  Private equity funds lend themselves to incentive fees in the form of 
partnership profits interests in the private equity fund limited partnership, since the 
receipt of the interest itself is not taxable under current law.  The partner’s share of the 
profits occurs as long term capital gain from the investment at the end of the investment 
life.  Under current law, the IRC taxes those profits as long term capital gain at a 
maximum rate of fifteen percent for individuals, rather than the maximum rate for 
ordinary income, including compensation, of thirty-five percent for individuals.85
Private equity funds play a variety of roles in the market.  Some acquire failing closely 
held businesses at low prices, often with seller financing, and seek to restructure them to 
make them profitable.  Others resemble venture capital funds; they acquire interests in 
nascent businesses with promising managers.  Most visible, however has been private 
equity funds’ involvement in major corporate takeovers, both friendly and hostile.  
In the public arena, tender offers provide the basic structure for corporate takeovers.  If 
the private equity fund wants to take the target corporation private, eliminating public 
shareholders and accompanying reporting requirements under the Exchange Act, the 
takeover assumes the shape of a two step acquisition.  The first step is a tender offer for a 
controlling or greater percentage of the shares of the publicly-traded target corporation.  
The second step is a merger or short form merger of the target with an acquisition 
corporation to eliminate the minority shareholders who did not tender their shares or 
whose shares the tender offeror did not acquire.   
The Exchange Act imposes a series of disclosure and procedural requirements on tender 
offers to protect shareholders and prevent the tender offeror from gaining an unfair 
advantage over the current management.86  The private equity fund may not circumvent 
the tender offer rules with market purchases of shares.  It may obtain no more than a five 
84 Despite commitments, many private equity fund managers will purchase or arrange the purchase of the 
interest of an investor who wishes to withdraw from the investment pool. 
85 See discussion supra in text accompanying note 74 and proposals to tax the manager’s share of the profit 
as ordinary income.  The ordinary income rate reverts to 2001 39.6 percent for individuals after 2010 under 
the sunset provision in 2001 taxation legislation. 
86 Exchange Act §14(d). 
Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and Sovereign Wealth Funds 
United States of America Report  
Professor Henry Ordower, Reporter 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
18th Congress, International Academy of Comparative Law 2010 Page 18 
percent interest in the target before it must make public disclosure of its intentions.87
Various rules prevent the tender offeror from pressuring shareholders to accept an offer 
before the shareholders have had an opportunity to observe the market reaction to the 
offer or management has had an opportunity to respond to the offer.  For example, a 
tender offer must remain open for twenty days during which shareholders who have 
tendered their shares may withdraw their tenders in favor of a competing tender offer or 
for any other reason.88  If the offeror increases the price paid for shares, the offeror must 
pay the increased price to earlier tendering shareholders.89  And tender offers for less than 
all shares of the target must be pro rata to all tendering shareholders.90
Target corporations’ managers have utilized a broad range of defensive tactics to ward 
off the potential private equity fund suitor for control of the corporation.  Target 
corporations have identified other potential bidders for the corporation and offered 
favorable terms for purchase of the target’s best assets if the favored bidder’s offer is 
unsuccessful.91  Sometimes targets make cash distributions to shareholders and even 
incur debt to make distributions, since most private equity funds borrow substantial sums 
to buy the target’s shares and then use the target’s liquid assets to repay the acquisition 
indebtedness.  A target with a great deal of debt or little cash is unattractive.  
Considerable litigation has ensued from takeover attempts and corporate resistance to 
potential takeovers.  Most litigation has been in Delaware state courts because Delaware 
is the state of incorporation for many public companies and questions of permissible 
takeover defenses and management’s fiduciary duties are matters of state, not federal 
law.92
After the acquisition private equity funds take an active role in the conduct and 
restructuring of the corporate business.  Since most takeovers use leveraged buyout 
techniques that impose the acquisition indebtedness on the target corporation, the 
takeovers tend to put the target at risk by materially increasing its debt-equity ratio.  
When the target enterprise has been unproductive, the private equity fund might sell the 
target’s component businesses separately, destroying the target as a continuing venture 
where that makes the greatest economic sense.  However, if economic maximization for 
the owner has an adverse impact on employees and the community, consideration of 
those constituencies might require the continued operation of the economically inefficient 
business.  The Delaware Supreme Court has been receptive to arguments that 
management may use corporate resources to defend against a hostile takeover to preserve 
the enterprise.  Once management has concluded that the corporation will change 
87 Exchange Act §13(e). 
88 Exchange Act Rule 14e-1. 
89 Exchange Act §14(d)(7). 
90 Exchange Act §14(d)(6). 
91 American takeover practice has developed a colorful vocabulary for takeover fights.  The favored bidder 
is a ―white knight,‖ the target’s best assets, the ―crown jewels‖ and so forth.
92 Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 US 462 (1977) (holding that there is no federal securities law claim for 
claims under corporate law).  The cases of Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del 
1985), Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A. 2d 1346 (Del 1985), and Revlon v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A. 2d 173 (Del 1985), all involve takeover fights and questions of permissible 
defenses. 
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ownership, it may seek only to maximize the sale price for shareholders.  Management no 
longer may rely on arguments of protecting the corporate enterprise or other 
constituencies as justifications for favoring one bidder over another.93
E.  Enhanced Regulation:  Categorizing and Controlling Risks.  For legislators and 
regulators who view hedge or private equity funds as significant contributors to the 
collapse of the markets in 2008, the question is one of which risks governmental 
intervention and regulation should address.  The preceding discussion identifies at least 
four different categories of parties subject to risk from the activities of hedge and private 
equity funds.  Each category of parties is subject to multiple risk types – some specific to 
the funds, other more general market risks.  Diminution and management of each risk 
type may require a regulatory configuration different from each other risk type.  Among 
the parties subject to risk:  (1) investors in the fund itself, (2) investor participants in the 
markets in which the fund is active but not investing in the fund, (3) parties doing 
business with the fund directly, including lenders and derivative counterparties, and (4) 
enterprises, including workers, and communities, that become the takeover targets of 
private equity funds or in which hedge funds acquire large positions.  Further there is the 
fundamental systemic risk that the activities of the fund might increase. 
1. Fund Investor Risk.   
a. Investor Characteristics.  Assuming that the bulk of investors in hedge 
and private equity funds meet the qualified purchaser test, risk to fund investors is not 
compelling as a premise for increased regulation under the disclosure/investor-protection 
underpinnings of the securities laws.  In comparison with open-ended financial risk under 
a business model like Lloyds of London,94 the conclusion that hedge or private equity 
fund investors need the protections that registration would provide them seems 
misplaced.  The sum that the investor agrees to invest defines the investor’s exposure, 
and a wealthy investor generally makes investments with differing risk/reward profiles, 
so a loss of the invested amount is consistent with the investor’s investment goals.  Even 
when an investor suspects that managers are engaging in illegal or unethical trading and 
management practices95 and the investor may have a private cause of action under the 
securities law, most investors prefer to withdraw from the fund quietly.   
As hedge funds have become retail investment products for investors who have only 
moderate assets,96 it makes sense to treat hedge funds as other retail products and have 
registration and additional regulation under the Securities Act and ICA.  One regulatory 
concern might be that promoters or broker/dealers are selling hedge and private equity 
fund investments to investors who cannot tolerate the economic risk or require greater 
liquidity than either type of fund provides.  The two to five year lock-up in private equity 
funds is appropriate only for investors not requiring investment liquidity.  While hedge 
funds, unlike private equity funds, do not lock investors in for extended periods, they 
93 Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A. 2d 173, 182 (Del 1985). 
94 This report describes the Lloyds’ business model supra in text accompanying note 49. 
95 See discussion infra in text accompanying note 106. 
96 See discussion supra in text accompanying note 75. 
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nevertheless may be too illiquid for investors who need the ready access to their money 
that mutual funds generally provide.  Hedge funds tend to allow redemptions at thirty to 
ninety day intervals but frequently require a lengthy advance notice of the investor’s 
intention to redeem.  Some of the rules are in place already.  If investment marketers sell 
to inappropriate investors, they violate the “know your customer” rules that SROs impose 
upon market participants.   
Congress and the SEC, in exercising its rulemaking authority, have dealt with different 
levels of investor protection providing the least protection for qualified purchasers, 
greater protection for moderately wealthy investors who have at least $1.5 in assets,97
and, finally, full investment company status and protections, including a prohibition on 
incentive fees, for funds that may offer and sell their interests publicly without regard to 
the characteristics of the investor.98  With or without registration, interests in all funds are 
securities subject to the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, so failures of 
disclosure give the investor a private right of action and permit the SEC to initiate 
enforcement proceedings.99  In addition, specific prohibitions apply to investment 
advisers engaging in manipulative practices.100
b. Conflicts between Investors’ and Managers’ Interests.  Unregistered 
funds are subject to additional investment risks.  Registered investment companies must 
mark positions for which market quotations exist to their current market value and the 
board of directors, which is at least forty percent independent, determines the value of 
other positions in good faith.101  Investment managers of unregistered funds have broader 
discretion in their choice of methods of and less oversight over their valuations of fund 
assets.  This valuation impacts investment, disinvestment, and calculation of the 
manager’s fee.  Clearing of derivative positions under Dodd-Frank will limit this 
discretion by creating a mark to market requirement for derivative positions. 
Since the manager generally receives a distribution or an allocation of ten to twenty 
percent of the increase in the value of the fund or each investor’s separate account in the 
fund, the manager has an incentive to overstate the fund’s value at the fee calculation 
intervals.  The incentive fee accrues whether or not the fund has converted the gain into 
money by disposing of appreciated positions.  Actual trades do not limit this valuation 
discretion significantly.102  Most hedge funds have more positions for which no market 
quotations are available than do registered investment companies.  Fund documents do 
not require investment managers to return any portion of an accrued incentive fee when 
the value of the fund, or the investor’s account, declines.  Often the fund documents 
prohibit the manager from collecting an incentive fee again until the fund’s value or the 
97 IAA Rule 205-3.  Hedge fund adviser may charge incentive or result fees to ―qualified clients‖ who, in 
the case of individuals, have at least $1.5 million in assets, as opposed to the $1 million asset threshold for 
―accredited investors‖ to whom issuers may sell private placement securities with any limit on the number 
of offerees or investors.  See Securities Act Reg. D and Rule 501.  
98 Subject of course to the requirement that the selling broker or dealer know its customer.  
99 Exchange Act §10b and rule 10b-5 under that statute. 
100 IAA §206. 
101 ICA Rule 2a-4. 
102 That is, the fee is a function of the unrealized appreciation in the value of the fund. 
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investor’s account value exceeds the level at which the fund previously accrued an 
incentive fee.103
This fee structure generates perverse incentives for the manager and increases investment 
risks for the investors.  If a fund has retreated substantially in value from its highest 
value, operating the fund is no longer profitable for the manager.  The manager will 
prefer to return the fund’s capital to the investors, open a new fund, and concentrate 
efforts on raising capital and generating profits for the new fund, thereby capturing new 
incentive fees.  Further, investors tend to withdraw their investment when the fund 
rapidly declines in value.  The manager has an incentive to encourage those redemptions 
and to understate the value of the fund when there are substantial redemptions.  
Following the redemptions, the manager may seek new investors and new investments 
from previous investors without the burden of the high water mark.104  There has been 
some discussion of regulating this practice, at least for registered advisors of “qualified 
client” funds by requiring managers to rebate accrued incentive fees when funds lose 
substantial value.105
Secrecy of the manager’s portfolio and trading strategy poses additional risk to hedge 
fund investors.  There is little to prevent the manager investing for the manager’s own 
account in advance of the fund’s large purchases or sales.106  Where a manager advises 
multiple funds, the manager may favor one fund over another in timing of investments so 
that one fund may condition the market for a trade by another fund.  While these and 
other market conditioning practices violate conflict of interest and ethical standards for 
registered investment advisers and may violate antifraud statutes, they are difficult to 
detect and sanctions tend to be lax.107  Following recent investigations of the practices, 
the SEC and both the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock 
Exchange, which now are part of FINRA, broadened their rules to require additional 
disclosure on pricing and valuation and adopted codes of ethics for investment advisers.  
Despite new rules and substantial fines in some instances, none of the new rules seem to 
have eliminated the practices that have the effect of shifting portions of the investors’ 
return on investment to the investment advisers.108
c. Theft and Fraud.  If the objective of additional regulation is to protect 
even the very wealthy from pyramid schemes, promoter theft of investors’ money, and 
other promoter frauds, rules under the Exchange Act antifraud provisions apply now, as 
do common law and state statutory fraud laws.  The SEC had the power to investigate the 
Madoff pyramid for violation of the general antifraud rules, as there were ongoing 
purchases and sales of investment units in the form of interests in the fictitious fund or 
103 Hedge fund managers refer to that value as a ―high water mark.‖
104 To the extent that managers engage in this strategy intentionally, it is a fund management variation of 
―pump and dump‖.
105 Referred to as a  ―claw back.‖
106 One variation of an unethical practice known as ―front-running.‖
107 For a discussion of questionable market practices including front running late trading, market timing, 
and manipulative valuation see William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and 
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2006). 
108 Id. at 1406-7. 
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Madoff’s brokerage.  Those interests are securities under the Exchange Act.109  A 
universal rule for independent custody of assets and bonding for employees of the 
manager and for the manager might reduce the number of assets thefts even from 
qualified purchaser funds.110  Extensions of some other limited protections such as an 
independent audit requirement for managed capital are possible added protections.   
Dodd-Frank includes a new required for registered advisers to safeguard client 
funds and give the SEC rulemaking authority to require verification of assets under 
custody.111  The new requirements are much less onerous than a requirement of third 
party custody, as required for registered investment companies, and auditing of fund 
balances. 
It may not only be hedge fund managers who object to new regulations that limit their 
flexibility and fees.  Wealthy investors may find such regulation unnecessary because 
they have the sophistication to negotiate desirable arrangements and fear that regulation 
may cost the manager flexibility that might limit the investors’ return.112
2. Risks for General Market Investors.  Many of the same practices that endanger 
the value of investments in hedge funds also may affect participants in the financial 
markets who are not fund investors adversely.  If a manager engages in market 
conditioning practices, including front running, market timing, and late trading, the 
advantage to the manager operates to the disadvantage to other participants in the 
financial markets.  The larger the hedge funds over which the manager has trading 
control, the greater the manager’s ability to use the fund’s assets, borrowing power, and 
influence to capture for the manager or the fund or both advantages in trade execution, 
access to desired initial public offering allocations, and broker/dealer favored customer 
status.  Funds with very large asset bases may engage in large trades or highly leveraged 
indirect trades through derivative positions that move the market in one direction or the 
other.  While the activities of the managers and their hedge funds may not create systemic 
risk,113 those activities may diminish the profit or increase the losses of others artificially 
109 Exchange Act §10(b) and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.  Exchange Act §3(a)(10) defines the term security 
broadly in substantially the same manner as the Securities Act discussed supra in text accompanying note 
34. 
110 Funds exempt from registration under ICA §3(c)(7).  Like the general antifraud provision, Exchange Act 
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5, absence of registration does not mean that any legal limitation exists for extending 
specific investor protection rules to unregistered funds.  However, custodial arrangements are a source of 
profit for managers who deal with the fund honestly as well as dishonest managers.   
111 Section 411 of Dodd-Frank.
112 Interestingly, there has been considerable discussion and innuendo concerning Madoff clients with 
respect to why they did not suspect something was amiss.  Part of the speculation has been that some of the 
larger clients and referrers knew the returns were consistently too high for the market but figured that 
Madoff was engaging in illegal and borderline trading strategies for the benefit of his investors.  In addition 
to front running, he was using his power to position himself to capture favored executions from his brokers 
and to trade after hours. 
113 Current proposals of the Obama administration address the systemic risk from hedge funds and the 
trading of derivative positions rather than the impact of market conditioning practices on others trading in 
the market.  Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals, supra note 31, at 43. 
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by forcing unexpected or sudden and temporary market movements that the hedge funds 
and their managers exploit to generate quick profits.   
Greater transparency would make the market experts aware of the specific market 
influences of the hedge funds and their managers and better able to assimilate that 
information into pricing.  Hedge fund portfolio and strategy information might acclimate 
the markets to specific manager’s practices and prevent some sudden market movements.  
To the extent that regulatory proposals would force greater disclosure from funds and 
managers, other market participants would be able to distinguish artificial from actual 
events that affect the markets and filter them out of pricing and purchase/sale decisions.  
Loss of those advantages to the hedge funds and their managers would likely limit the 
profitability of the funds and lower fees for the managers.   
New legislation requires greater transparency by requiring unregistered advisors to hedge 
funds and private equity firms to register.114  Registration include regular reporting of the 
advisors trading activities and the market positions of the funds they advise.  The stated 
purpose for the registration and reporting is to enable the regulatory agencies to assess if 
any of the managers or funds pose general market risk.115  If they do, they may become 
subject to enhanced regulation.  
3. Risks for Counterparties and Lenders.  Systemic Risks.   
a. Hedge Funds.  To the extent that hedge funds utilize substantial 
borrowing and financial leverage in their investing activities, they pose an economic risk 
to their lenders and counterparties.  With respect to borrowing, under rules of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, banks remain subject to certain per borrower lending 
limits that prohibit banks from lending more than fifteen percent of their capital to a 
single borrower.116 In addition, under the Federal Reserve Bank’s regulations governing 
the margin requirements for broker/dealer lending on margin securities,117 the general 
limit is fifty percent of value margin requirement and 150 percent for short sales.118  In 
addition, banks are subject to a maximum securities lending limit of 100 percent of 
value.119  Various exceptions exist for both margin requirements and overall lending 
limits.  While hedge funds might borrow from other organizations that are not 
institutional lenders or broker/dealers – pension and profit sharing plans, charitable 
organizations, state and local governments, insurance companies, for examples – and 
issue notes to those institutions, lender monitoring of hedge fund’s debt load is critical to 
preventing default.  Regulated financial institutions must examine customers’ financial 
statements before extending credit and would observe the presence of outstanding notes 
to other lenders.  Nevertheless, a default by a particularly large hedge fund or several 
funds might jeopardize the stability of the lending financial institution.   
114 Section 403 of Dodd-Frank. 
115 Section 404 of Dodd-Frank.   
116 12 C.F.R. §32.3. 
117 Federal Reserve Bank Reg. T, 12 CFR §220. 
118 Id.  12 CFR §220.12. 
119 Reg. U.  12 CFR §221. 
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Off balance sheet financing makes it difficult to assess a hedge fund’s debt load and 
thereby increases the hazards to lenders and other counterparties.  Indebtedness from 
financial leverage in the form of various derivative positions is far less transparent than 
traditional borrowing activity and short sales.  If the size and volume of the derivative 
positions is large, default by the hedge fund’s counterparties, as well as default by the 
hedge fund itself, may render the hedge fund unable to pay its traditional borrowings.  
Only a small adverse movement in the markets may cause an extremely leveraged hedge 
fund to default on its derivative positions, as well as its traditional indebtedness, so that 
the hedge fund poses a risk to its derivative counterparties.  Dodd-Frank will limit some 
of the off balance sheet financing by requiring reporting of credit exposure120 and 
clearing of derivatives.121
b. Private Equity Funds.  In the context of corporate takeovers, private 
equity funds borrow heavily to fund the acquisition of the shares of the target company.  
As the acquisition is a leveraged buyout, the private equity fund’s intention is to service 
the acquisition indebtedness with the target’s cash flow or proceeds from the sale of 
target’s assets.  Since the acquisition indebtedness may equal or exceed the historical 
value of the target, and, almost invariably exceeds the liquidation value of the target, as 
the private equity borrower anticipates that it will be able to improve the target’s 
profitability, the margin of error is quite thin.  Default is likely.  In many instances, the 
private equity fund will renegotiate the terms of the indebtedness as the target proves less 
profitable than anticipated.122
c. Systemic Risk.  Leverage, whether for the purpose of funding a private 
equity fund’s corporate acquisition or a hedge fund’s trading activities, may generate 
systemic risk.  A borrower’s or derivative counterparty’s default may cause the lender or 
counterparty to default on its own obligations.  Those defaults may lead to further 
defaults of other counterparties and lenders to the original counterparties and lender.  A 
default in a large credit facility, whether direct lending or derivative, has the potential to 
cause a domino effect.  Additional systemic risk follows short selling practices.  Market 
professionals have observed that short selling exerts downward pressure on the value of 
the securities.  Loss in value of securities may cause holders of long positions to become 
unable to meet margin calls on those securities and, ultimately, cause the broker/dealer 
margin lender to default on its obligations.  Market collapse may follow if sufficient 
defaults occur within a short period, as happened in late 2008. 
It is difficult to evaluate what role hedge and private equity funds played in the market 
events in 2008. They certainly were not the most visible actors but may have been the 
least transparent ones.  While hedge funds have engaged in a significant volume of 
derivative trading, they have not been the only participants in those markets.  Banks, 
120 Section 204(b)(3) of the IAA, as amended by section 404 of Dodd-Frank. 
121 Title VII and VIII of Dodd-Frank. 
122 See discussion of risks from target restructuring in the text accompanying note 127 infra. 
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insurance companies, charitable organizations, pension and profit sharing funds, and 
governmental entities all sought to enhance their portfolios with derivative trading.123
Perhaps the most visible derivative event in 2008 was American International Group’s 
inability to pay on its credit default swaps.  AIG sold many credit default swaps on which 
it was not hedged and was unable to meet its obligations.  Those swaps resembled AIG’s 
core business of risk insurance products, but their volume exceeded normal risk insurance 
exposure because the swaps did not require that the counterparty to the swap have any 
insurable interest in the reference debtor or debt instrument.124  If hedge funds were 
major purchasers of credit default swaps, their participation in that market augmented the 
systemic risk.  Media reports did not disclose that hedge funds were major AIG 
counterparties in the credit default swaps.125
Subprime lending and accompanying mortgage defaults drove the market event in 
2008.126  As the economy weakened, those borrowers began to default on their 
mortgages.  As interest rates rose, adjustable rate mortgages reset their interest rates and 
borrowers defaulted.  Similarly, governmental entities and other borrowers were unable 
to find a market for resetting the interest rate on their auction rate securities and were 
required to pay the higher rate that the instruments required in the absence of a market 
reset.  The market for auction rate securities became illiquid.  Those events had little to 
do with hedge funds or private equity funds.   
4. Risks to Target Enterprises, Employees, and Communities.  Private equity 
funds and, in limited cases, hedge funds that acquire large stakes in an enterprise pose 
significant risks to those enterprises, their workers, and the communities of which they 
are a part.  Leveraged acquisitions threaten enterprises by saddling them with 
indebtedness that, absent a substantial increase in profitability, will drive the enterprises 
into bankruptcy.  But like questions of derivative regulation, the issue of the impact of 
corporate takeover is not a private equity fund issue.   
Whenever there is a leveraged acquisition, the acquirer, whether another corporate 
enterprise, an individual, or a private equity fund, seeks to capture the hidden value of the 
target by disposing of inefficient features of the enterprise and restructuring the 
123 Compare the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Hedge 
Funds Oversight Final Report 8 (available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf) 
(making 6 recommendations for additional regulation but acknowledging that hedge funds were not 
significant contributors to the market downturn in 2008).   
124 A holder of a bond might purchase a credit default swap to protect against default on the bond or any 
lender might buy a swap to protect against default by the borrower.  In those instances, the bondholder or 
lender has an insurable interest and could buy credit insurance or require the borrower to buy credit 
insurance to protect the bondholder or lender.  The derivative credit default swap has a reference borrower 
or instrument, but the purchaser of the swap need not have any interest in that borrower or instrument to be 
entitled to a payment in the event of a default. 
125 Mary Williams Walsh, Inquiry Asks Why A.I.G. Paid Banks, THE NEW YORK TIMES B4 (March 27, 
2009) 
126 Contrary to the implication of the term, subprime lending refers to lending to less creditworthy 
individuals than traditional home mortgage borrowers.  Generally, subprime loans require substantial fees 
and high interest rates.  
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remainder of the enterprise to enhance its profitability.  In some instances, the acquirer 
will sell parts of the enterprise resulting in the loss of employment and exit of that part of 
the enterprise from the community.  Restructuring may cost jobs in the short run, but, if 
successful, may lead to a more efficient, profitable, and expanding enterprise with new 
job opportunities.  Private equity funds are no more ruthless in breaking up an enterprise 
and no less patient in restructuring the enterprise than are other acquirers, although they 
may have less commitment to the enterprise and the community than if existing 
management acquired the enterprise.  Delaware court decisions suggest that management 
resist takeovers in order to protect the corporate culture and the community.127
Corporate acquisitions of other major corporations may not depend upon leveraged 
acquisitions as much as other acquirers.  However, those acquisitions may have more 
impact on employment in a community and support for culture in the community than a 
private equity fund acquisition.  The corporate acquirer has a headquarters elsewhere and 
is likely to shift management functions to its existing headquarters to minimize 
management redundancies.  That shift not only affects local employment but tends to 
diminish corporate support for local cultural institutions.128
F.  Sovereign Wealth Fund Overview.  As state-owned investment vehicles, SWFs are 
exempt from taxation in the United States as long as they do not engage in commercial 
activity.129  Most SWFs are independent entities with a board of directors and managers 
who are not necessarily government officials.130  Excess foreign currency reserves 
provide the primary funding for SWFs and stabilize revenues from the sale of 
commodities such as oil or natural gas.  While SWFs historically invested in traditional 
financial instruments like United States Treasury Bonds, fund managers seeking higher 
returns and greater diversification turned increasingly to equities.  In the wake of a weak 
economy, SWFs made large investments in Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Blackstone, 
Carlyle and Merrill Lynch.  In 2008, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority invested $7.5 
billion in Citigroup, Inc, the China Investment Company invested $5 billion in Morgan 
Stanley, and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings invested $6.2 billion in Merrill Lynch & Co. 
Inc.131
1. Principal Concerns.  While SWFs have existed since the 1950s without 
attracting regulatory interest, they have begun to face scrutiny because they have grown 
rapidly in recent years.  In 1990, estimates pegged SWFs at approximately $500 billion in 
127 Weinberger v. UOP, supra note 28. 
128 In St. Louis, Nestle’s acquisition of Ralston Purina in 2001 and InBev’s acquisition of Anheuser Busch 
in 2008 both had significant adverse impacts on the St. Louis community and employment in St. Louis, as 
well as diminished support for St. Louis cultural institutions. 
129 IRC §892(a).  See Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 440 (2009) (arguing that the exemption is unjustified and proposing methods for 
taxation). 
130 Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds:  Do Taxes Encourage 
Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States 3-4 (U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ, Research 
Paper No. 08-28, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291878. 
131 Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., ECONOMIC AND US INCOME TAX ISSUES RAISED BY SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUND INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 29 
(Comm. Print 2008) (hereafter JCT). 
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assets.132  Today, estimates show them controlling some $3.22 trillion in assets.133
According to the IMF, SWFs could reach $6-10 trillion by 2013.134  High oil prices, 
financial globalizations, and sustained, large global imbalances all contributed to oil 
exporters and Asian countries accumulating substantial foreign assets.135  The size of the 
funds has caused policymakers to express concern that SWFs will invest in ways that 
cause volatility in markets and disruptions in economies.   
Like hedge funds, SWFs tend to be opaque.  While there is some information on SWFs, 
there is no uniform public disclosure of the assets, strategies, and governance of SWFs.136
Few SWFs publish information on their size, returns, composition of their portfolios, 
investment objectives, and proxy voting policies and some countries specifically prohibit 
any public disclosure of their SWF activities.137  Lack of transparency makes it difficult 
to access the inflow of capital from SWFs.  Foreign investors, including governments, 
private entities, and individuals, may have owned over $20 trillion of United States assets 
in 2007.138  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that SWFs accounted for at least 
$21.5 billion of that investment, but that estimate may understate SWF investments 
substantially.139
More important than the possibility that the size and opaqueness of SWFs may 
undermine market stability is the ability of the funds to use their economic power to 
pursue political goals.  While the funds serve primarily to protect the economic future of 
their home countries, political objectives may inform investment decisions.  Governments 
might exploit the large pools of capital in the funds to secure access to strategic assets, 
including natural resources and defense-related technologies, and threaten national 
security in the United States.140  Nevertheless, there has been no evidence that SWFs are 
politically motivated investors.141
2.  New Outlook.  Before the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers had expressed concerns 
about SWFs.  Currently, some policymakers view SWFs as a stabilizing force in the 
economy, as SWF investments have provided the necessary liquidity in some sectors.   
132 Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 44 FIN. & DEV. 56, (2007), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight.htm. 
133 Research and Markets: 2009 Sovereign Wealth Fund Review as they Currently Control an Aggregate 
$3.22tn in Assets Under Management, (Reuters Apr 1, 2009), online at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS175494+01-Apr-2009+BW20090401(visited July 24, 
2009). 
134 Mark Allen and Jaime Caruana, eds, Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda 6 (IMF Feb 29, 2008), 
online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf (visited June 15, 2009). 
135 Id.  at 4. 
136 Id.  at 8. 
137 Government Accountability Office, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Publicly Available Data on Sizes and 
Investments for Some Funds Are Limited, GAO-08-946, 4 (Sept 2008), online at 
http://www.gao.gov/news.items/d08946.pdf (visited July 24, 2009).  
138 Id. at 5. 
139 JCT supra note 2, at 27. 
140 Id. at 30.  An additional concern is that SWFs may compete unfairly with private actors through 
government guarantees of financial commitment.  Id. at 31.  Those funds would become taxable in the U.S. 
if they engage in commercial ventures.  IRC §892(a)(2). 
141 Id. 
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Yet, concern with the lack of transparency lingers.  Comprised of 26 IMF member 
countries with SWFs, the IWG developed the “Santiago Principles” in October 2008 to 
address the lingering concern that SWFs lacked transparency and regulatory oversight.142
The Santiago principles “identify a framework of generally accepted principles and 
practices that properly reflect appropriate governance and accountability arrangements as 
well as the conduct of investment practices by SWFs on a prudent and sound basis.”143
The IWG members have committed to implementing the Santiago Principles, which 
include a commitment to financial objectives and guidelines for better transparency and 
disclosure of SWF relationships with the sponsoring government.  As implementation is 
voluntary, non-compliance carries no sanctions.   
3.  United States Regulation of SWF Investment.  While the United States is open to 
foreign investment, laws limit or restrict foreign investments in banking, 
communications, transportation, natural resources and energy, agriculture, and defense in 
order to protect national security.144  In addition, foreign investors are subject to review 
by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).  CFIUS, which 
was codified by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA),145 is 
a committee of the United States government that reviews the national security 
implications of foreign investments.146  The CFIUS monitors overseas acquisitions of ten 
percent or more of a domestic company’s total ownership.  CFIUS has shown particular 
interest in transactions where the target United States company has classified contracts 
with the United States government or technologies critical to national defense.147 Under 
the CFIUS process, investors file a voluntary notice, often even when it appears that the 
transaction does not involve a controlling ownership.  After notice is received, CFIUS 
begins a thirty day National Security Review.148  Following this review, CFIUS may 
either allow the transaction to proceed or undertake a second, forty-five day National 
Security Investigation.149  CFIUS has approved the vast majority of notified transactions 
during the initial thirty-day period but CFIUS has begun to subject a growing number of 
transactions to the forty-five-day investigation.150  While CFIUS has rejected few 
acquisitions, investor SWFs have abandoned a number of investments because of the 
CFIUS process.  For example, in 2006, Check Point, an Israeli company, cited the CFIUS 
142 See Int’l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices: ―Santiago Principles‖, 28 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.iwg-
swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf (listing IWG members).  The acronym ―GAPP‖ refers to the 
principles.  
143 Id. at 4. 
144 See Government Accountability Office, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Laws limiting Foreign Investment 
Affect Certain U.S. Assets and Agencies Have Various Enforcement Processes, GAO-09-608, 15-16 (May 
2009), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09608.pdf (visited July 28, 2009), for a list of laws 
specifically applying to foreign investors. 
145 The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (codified 
at 50 Appx USCA § 2170(k)). 
146 Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of 
Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 118 (2009).   
147 Jamie S. Gorelick, Stephen W. Preston & Jonathan G. Cedarbaum, The CFIUS Review Process: A 
Regime in Flux, 2008 A.B.A. INT’L L. SEC. 3.   
148 50 U.S. C. app. § 2170(b)(1) (2000). 
149 Id. § 2170(b)(2). 
150 Jamie S. Gorelick, supra note 18.   
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process as the basis for abandoning a deal to acquire a United States company, 
Sourcefire, which produced intrusion detection technology that many United States 
government departments in various sensitive contexts utilized.151  For the SWFs which do 
not voluntarily give notice to the CFIUS, there is no time limit on the President’s 
authority to investigate and reject even a completed SWF acquisition.152
Since the FINSA changes, CFIUS often conditions its approval of SWF investments on 
the signing of a mitigation agreement which might stipulate that the SWF remain a 
passive shareholder and not seek representation on the target’s board of directors.153  For 
example, as a condition to its $7.5 billion investment in Citi, Abu Dhabi’s SWF agreed 
“not to own more than a 4.9% stake in Citi, and will have no special rights of ownership 
or control and no role in the management or governance of Citi, including no right to 
designate a member of the Citi Board of Directors.”154  Recently, SWFs have structured 
their investments in United States financial institutions to avoid CFIUS review.  In those 
instances, the SWFs take no board seats and acquire less than a ten percent interest.  The 
funds also publicly disclaim any ability to oversee or engage in the management of the 
company or business.155
SWFs must abide by the same rules as private pools of capital.  SWFs are subject to the 
antifraud provisions of the securities laws, the antitrust laws, and state corporate laws.  If 
SWFs acquire a five percent or greater equity stake in a public company, they must make 
disclosures in accordance with the Exchange Act.156  In order to avoid disclosure 
requirements pursuant to the Exchange Act, most SWFs acquire less than five percent of 
any United States company.  State laws protect against those SWFs with a member on the 
board. Directors owe a duty of care and loyalty to the company and stockholders which 
requires them to make decisions based on the best interests of the company and its 
stockholders.  State statutes and legal precedents prohibit SWF managers from passing 
confidential information that they might gain from their activities on behalf of the fund.
Trading of shares when the SWF possesses non-public information would violate federal 
antifraud rules under the securities laws.157
151 Id. at 5. 
152 Id. at 2. 
153 Paul Rose, Sovereigns As Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 128 (2008).   
154 Id. 
155 Id.  
156 Exchange Act §13(e), 15 U.S. C. §78a-??? 
157 Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. 
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General Reporter’s Questionnaire
Dear Colleagues,  
According to the letter I received from the secretariat, the topic, which we are supposed 
to deal with, is entitled 
“La réglementation des fonds spéculatifs/ The regulation of private equity, hedge funds 
and state funds”
No need to state that the English translation is substantially from the French title.  
These are three relatively different subjects among which it will be difficult to find a 
common denominator. The most likely common element is to be found in the behaviour 
of these funds as shareholder in investee companies (see part 2).  
Therefore I propose to open three serious of questions, the first one relating more to the 
organisation of these funds, the second more related to their action as shareholders or in 
society in general. The SWF are then in a separate class.  
1. Legal issues relating to hedge funds (HF) and private equity funds (PEF).  
1. The existence of a legal regime, whether in regulation or outside regulation could 
be mentioned briefly. Analysis of the different regulations relating to hedge funds can i.e. 
be found in the recent IOSCO consultation paper.  
The question will arise as to the definition of HF or PEF: I would propose that we do not 
attempt to draw up a definition, as this has proved impossible by several international 
regulatory bodies. Especially for HF, the formula is so elusive and adapts so rapidly to 
market circumstances that any definition would run behind the facts. One can refer to 
attempts made by i.a. the IOSCO paper mentioned in the attached list.  
In the more recent terminology, HF are referred to as “private pools of capital” and I’m 
not sure that is a right designation. 
2. If there is regulation specifically applicable to HF and PE funds, please mention 
the nature and general features of the regulation, e.g. whether this is public or private 
regulation, and in the latter case, if it is followed up in practice, and enforced by some 
external body. Most of the HF are registered in some tax heaven: why is this feature 
considered important for the application of the regulation in your jurisdiction?  
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3. How many of these funds are registered?  
4. As to the general purport, it would be useful to indicate whether the regulation 
addresses the manager, or also the fund, as both systems are practised. The main subjects 
that are covered in the regulation should also be mentioned, e.g. whether there is 
registration of the manager, what are the criteria applicable to it, are there restrictions 
with other activities e.g. asset management for other funds that HF.  
5. In the future it is likely that the regulation will be more developed about the 
creation of HF and PEF: own funds, gearing ratio’s, conduct of business rules, 
information and /or disclosure rules, accounting provisions, rules on manager’s 
remuneration. 
6. The – public - distribution of shares in these funds deserves some mention, as in 
many states, these funds cannot be offered to the public. In fact they may be offered 
indirectly, through Funds of Hedge Funds (FoHF) , through insurance products, or in 
other forms. The disclosure and other investor protection rules could be different 
depending on the legal structure chosen. Here a few mentions would be useful. What is 
the status of this debate about “alternative products,” or “ substitute products”? Some in 
the EU consider extending the MiFid1 rules to all investment products: what is your 
reaction to this?    
7. Have there been cases of misselling of HFs or FoHFs?  Were these decided in 
court? Have investors been indemnified?  
3. Except in case of public distribution, it would be useful to have some idea about 
the nature of the holders of shares in these HF or PEF: traditionally, it was said that these 
were wealthy individuals, but it appears that apart from FoHF, institutional investors 
(pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds) are increasingly acquiring shares 
in these funds: is the protection regime sufficient, and should regulation contribute to 
improve the position of these not always so sophisticated investors.  
4. Where do you stand in this debate about extending the protections to a wider 
public that these so-called sophisticated investors?  This is not typical for HF but has 
caused most concern if HF were involved.  
5. Do investors in HF and PEF have sufficient information, whether on entry or on a 
continuous basis? Should this be left entirely to the freedom of contract or should the law 
provide for a generic measure. As HF are increasingly placed with a large public but even 
without a public issue how should the information system not be adopted? Continuous 
information on the evolution of the portfolio is even more important, as investors often 
are left in the dark until it is too late.  
6. If in your jurisdiction the managers have to be licensed, what are the conditions 
for obtaining the license: a few items might be: 
1 Esp. rules on know your customer, suitability, and so on.  
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a. Fit and proper character of the managers 
b. Rules on conflict of interest 
c. Rules on risk management: these have been considered too weak 
d. Internal rules on valuation: contractual rules or IFRS?   
e. Internal rules on compliance 
f. Internal rules on asset segregation, on due diligence of investee 
g. Is there an internal and /or an external audit 
And are these conditions verified by an external body initially upon registration and from 
time to time?  
 Some of these issues are particularly important for PEF: valuation, conflicts of 
interest are well known problems. How does your legal system deal with these?  
7. The recent crisis has indicated that HF may be exposed to substantial systemic 
risk, and hence that central banks, as systemic and prudential supervisors want to obtain 
data about their portfolios and their behaviour in the markets of at least the largest of 
these funds: 
a. Do HF and PEF usually inform these authorities about their portfolio, even 
if only some time ex post? 
b. Have these authorities access through their prime brokers? And can the 
information be aggregated?  
c. Is apart from leverage, the built up of important positions in certain assets 
that could trigger significant price movement upon a certain liquidity need, a point of 
concern? 
d. Should these funds disclose their portfolios publicly?  
8. What is the position on the remuneration of the HF managers: is there a public 
debate in your country and are there proposals to improve on this point? 
9. PEF, and to a lesser extent, HF have been accused to destroy the companies they 
invest in: the so-called “locust” phenomenon. Is this a public debate in your country and 
have the authorities dealt with it? What answers have been given, or what remedies could 
apply? (this could also be dealt with in part 2)  
10. Market abuse by HF is often mentioned: are there cases that have been reported in 
your country? Were these specific to HF activity, e.g. related to the volume of their 
business in a given market? Is there a policy dealing with rumours?  
11. Clauses about the withdrawal from HF or PEF: how are these structured? How 
did they work in the downward markets? Have investors complained about unjust 
treatment on exit? What techniques have been used to postpone the exercise of exit 
rights?  
Part II: the social role of the Hedge funds, Private Equity Funds   
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 2.1 What has been the role of PEF in your country: there are widely divergent 
opinions, the PEF stating themselves that they mainly offer management services, with an 
equity investment to maximise their returns.    
On the other hand, HF and PEF have been accused of destroying firms through 
excessive leverage and appropriation of financial substance. What is the prevailing 
opinion on this subject in your jurisdiction?   
They also have been accused of destroying employment2: what is the prevailing 
opinion in your country.  
Have measures been taken to curb these negative consequences, e.g. regulating 
closures of plants, or massive lay-offs? What is their effectiveness? Have these aspects 
been litigated in court?  
Is there any government’s measure that has been taken, or is envisaged on these 
topics? Is there voluntary restraint by the PEF themselves? What kind of measures have 
they taken:  Reducing leverage, duration of investment, etc 
 2.3 HF and to a more exceptionally PEF have been known for their activist stand 
as shareholders, although they are by no means the only ones. Usually they put the board 
under pressure so that it would adapt its policies to their views.  
How should board react to these attempts? What are the limits for boards to enter 
into contact with these activist shareholders?  
2.4 What are the techniques used to pursue their position even owning only a 
minor block of shares?  
 Proxy voting 
 Voting agreements  
 Alliances with institutional investors 
 Short sales as an activist instrument 
 Media alerts 
 2. 4. Can any of the following be used as techniques to exercise pressure by HF or 
PEF 
 -Right to call the general meeting 
 -Motion to dismiss the board of directors 
 - Motion to split-up the company, or to merge it with another 
2 From European Venture capital Association:  
 Investments by European private equity and venture capital firms amounted to €73.8bn in 2007, and 
approximately 5,200 European companies received private equity investments. About 85% of these 
companies have fewer than 500 employees. Studies show that between 2000 and 2004 European private 
equity and venture capital financed companies created 1 million new jobs, which translates to a compound 
annual growth rate of 5.4% per year (eight times the EU25 total employment rate of 0.7%). Between 1997 
and 2004, the average employment growth in buyout-financed companies was 2.4%, compared to 30.5% 
for venture-backed companies.
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 -Motion to close down certain parts of the business, or to sell it off to third parties 
(major disposals).  
 Do these decisions belong to the competence of the general meeting or can the 
board of directors take them.  
 Is the present threshold to call a general meeting widely accepted or are they 
criticised.  
 2.5. Are HF  known for gaining support to their ideas 
 - By using the media: are measures against equity manipulation effectively put in 
action? Should public announcements about forthcoming action not be subject to the 
same rules as for board announcements see: reg FD)  
-Should there not be more transparency about the identity of the owners of voting 
rights in general? And about the shareholders in activist funds (concert action)  
- Companies generally do not know the names of their shareholders due to the 
indirect ownership structures; what measures should be taken to ensure that boards have 
the names of their shareholders, and engage in a debate with them. What is being done 
about it? 
- Important shareholders hide their ownership by the use of derivatives or 
complex financial constructions; by entering into equity swaps, contracts for difference 
and similar transactions 
 - By creating secret alliances with other shareholders, or by hiding their own 
voting position: what are the techniques usually followed? .  
P.M. is there a debate in your jurisdiction about “empty voting” and how do you 
think this can be solved. 
 2.6 What defences can boards use to resist pressure from activist shareholders? 
 Is there a board neutrality rule, or only in Takeover bids?  
Some advise to engage with the activists: defensive action is a last resort: Can 
boards communicate with activist shareholders, or should they abstain on the basis of 
equal treatment?  
2.8. Some actions by minority shareholders are close to greenmail: does this 
happen in your country, what is the attitude of the courts and what can be done about it? 
What is the liability of directors in giving in to greenmail? Disclosure?     
 On PEF 
 2.9. Does your legal system recognise an obligation of the shareholders to act in 
the interest of the company, or to can he act in his own selfish interest? 
 Does a shareholder have to act taking into account the respect for the interest of 
other fellow shareholders (fiduciary duty of the control shareholder)?  
Part 3 the sovereign wealth funds 
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 The notion of SWF is somewhat ambiguous: the aspect discussed here refers to 
the fact that foreign entities are owned by a foreign state and/or act on the orders of a 
foreign state. Some of these may be specific funds, funded out of excess foreign 
exchange reserves; other may be longstanding companies with a “public mission”. 
The potential detrimental policy influence has been at the centre of the debate, although 
the sheer size of their portfolio’s and the lack of transparency may also be mentioned as 
points of concern. In case of difficulty, position may be imposed outside the boundaries 
of company law, but by e.g. the rules protecting direct foreign investment.  
 The Subject has now found a new equilibrium due to the financial crisis. The 
Santiago rules have also contributed to calming the debate.  
 Does your country regulate the activity of SWF and in which way? 
 Are there figures available about the inflow of capital coming from SWF?   
 Can you briefly describe some cases in which access to SWF have been refused, 
indicating the grounds on which this refusal was based.  
Have you in your legal order introduced procedures – possibly generally 
applicable – that are applied to SWF and ensure openness of their activity.  
Have SWF published their policy objectives, whether in general or upon a 
specific investment. Do they publish their voting polices, and the way these are 
implemented 
Do SWF usually delegate a member to the board? Are there special rules 
applicable to that member e.g. with respect to secrecy?  
Should investee companies include a passage in their annual reports about the 
presence of a SWF and its action within the investee company?  Or on the way the SWF 
has voted 
Have there been mechanisms introduced reviewing, or surveilling the activity 
deployed by SWF in investee companies?  
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Forthcoming regulation in the EU and in the US(March—April 2009)  
On SW : http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm: Santiago principles 
On HF: http://www.hfsb.org/: HF standards board 
A clearinghouse system for derivative products limits market flexibility, as standardized 
contracts and quantities do not necessarily fulfil the needs of participants in those 
markets.  In the late 1990s, the IASD created a standardized contract for derivatives.  
Users of the standard contract tended to modify it terms so substantially through the 
contract schedules that the standard form was left only as a skeleton to provide some 
inconsequential boilerplate language and to remind uses or of the types of terms that they 
needed.  For simple derivatives like a fixed to floating interest rate or currency to 
currency swap that have straightforward business uses, standardization and a 
clearinghouse might work well, but standardization will eliminate many complex 
products.  As a policy matter, those complex structures may be undesirable so that loss of 
them might not be so bad.   
